I am giving a talk at the Wittgenstein and Ancient Philosophy-conference at Athens in June 29.-July 1.
For more information, please see: https://finninstitute.gr/en/kalenteri/wittgenstein-and-ancient-philosophy-2/.
Abstract:
In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein (in)famously asks: “what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?” (PI§621). This bit of “Wittgensteinian arithmetic” has been much discussed in the philosophy of action. Taken straightforwardly, the question resembles an equation: some unknown variable—x—is ‘left over’ when one subtracts the bodily movement (‘my arm goes up’) from the action (‘I raise my arm’); the task for philosophy of action is to solve for x. Standardly philosophers have resolved the equation by bringing in causation, analysing action as a compound of a bodily movement and something that functions as the cause—e.g. desire—and which transforms the ‘mere’ physical movement into action. Call this ‘the standard story’ of action. Wittgenstein himself did not intend the question to be taken in this way, but rather as a critique.[1] Instead of analysing the concept of action in terms of more basic categories we should think of (intentional) action itself as a basic notion and proceed from there. Call this the ‘intentionalist’-approach.
Recently philosophers critical of the standard story have increasingly turned to both Wittgenstein and Aristotle in the search of alternative ways of thinking about action. For instance, Stoutland claims that Wittgenstein is “closer to Aristotle” than the Cartesians and Empiricists Wittgenstein opposed.[2] One way Wittgenstein opposed these views was by being critical of construing “all words as names of objects, events, or occurrences” (Schroeder 2010, 554; cf. PI§1). Words denoting action (and related concepts like desire or will) are a case in point: ‘desiring’ does not name a distinct entity (which causes bodily motion).
But it is not clear that Aristotle is a reliable ally. First: Aristotle holds quite generally that words do function as names; see De Interpretatione. Moreover, he accepts that terms like desire do name occurrences (activities) which cause bodily movement (cf. De Anima III.10).
These points of difference aside I argue that we should nevertheless see Aristotle’s approach to action as having more in common with intentionalist approach than the ‘standard story’. This emerges when we consider what Aristotle takes to be ontologically, observationally, and explanatorily basic. For Aristotle actions constitute a kind of basic and (in some cases) non-reducible category (cf. Metaphysics IX.6 and 8). Importantly, activities (energeiai) are ontologically basic and they explain bodily movements, not the other way around. It is because I act—because I raise my arm—that I move my body in this kind of way (such that my arm goes up). So understood Aristotle can (and should!) be seen as an ally to those wishing to resist the standard story of action. Both Wittgenstein and Aristotle offer us very different ways of approaching philosophical questions and this difference should be recognized and celebrated; it shows that there are more than one way to resist various orthodoxies in contemporary analytical philosophy.
[1] See e.g. Jaeger 1973 & 1976, Stoutland 1989, Schoeder 2010, Lavin 2013.
[2] Stoutland 1989, 61.