I will be presenting at the International Aristotle Conference in Lisbon on July 3rd as part of “Aristotle on Epagōgē—A Unitary Concept?”-panel together with Michael Peramatzis, Miira Tuominen, Mika Perälä, and Benjamin Wilck (we asked Miira Tuominen to join the panel when Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila had to decline; additionally Antonio Ferro also had to cancel his participation). Please see below for the abstract for my talk – Epagōgē, Perception, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Physics – and for the panel.
If you are in Lisbon, come along! The conference programme is excellent. Needless to say I am very excited.
Epagōgē, Perception, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Physics
In Physics I.2, Aristotle notes that the apparent fact that all or some natural things are changing is clear from epagôgê. In Physics V.1 and 5 Aristotle claims that that change is between contraries is clear from epagōgē. I suggest thatin these cases we should understand epagōgē asinvolving a process of recognition where particular cases are recognized as belonging to a common kind. Here particulars need not be understood as individuals but can also include types (of change or subject). It is in virtue of this kind of survey that Aristotle moves from particular cases to a general claim regarding all change/subjects of change. This kind of survey relies on perception, and on moving from what is more familiar to us to what is more familiar by nature (as noted by Aristotle’s methodological remarks in Physics I.1). However, a problem arises when we consider epagōgē (understood as moving from particulars to universals) and the method of study as outlined in Physics I.1 184a21-26 where Aristotle claims we must proceed from the universal to the particular. I show that this claim need not be seen as conflicting with our understanding of epagōgē.
Aristotle on Epagōgē—A Unitary Concept?
Aristotle’s use of epagôgê remains an understudied concept in the Philosopher’s corpus. Roughly he has three somewhat different ways to characterize epagôgê: (A) as a way of reasoning in which one proceeds from particular cases to a universal generalization (see for instance Top I.12 and APr II.23); (B) as a way of acquiring general concepts based on sense perception, memory, and experience (see for instance Rhet I.2 and APo II.19); and (C) as a kind of recognition of particulars under universals already known (cf. APr II.21; APo I.1; EN VI.8 & VI.11). It is highly controversial how these ways are related to each other. Indeed, the different uses raise the question if these cases of epagôgê are unified, or if epagôgê means something different in different cases (making the uses homonymous). We explore some of the different uses of epagôgê in the corpus, arguing that a case can be made for understanding the term as a unitary concept.
The proposal to be studied is the following. Aristotle contrasts epagôgê and syllogism by reference to the direction of epistemic progression: while epagôgê proceeds from what is better known to us to what is better known to nature, syllogism proceeds the other way round (see for instance APr II.23 68b8–37). Although Aristotle admits that there are different kinds of syllogism (e.g., demonstration, syllogism, dialectical syllogism and rhetorical syllogism), he takes them to point in the same direction, i.e., from that which is better known to nature to that which better known to us (there are some exceptions e.g. in APo I.1 where he discusses demonstrations which are both deductive and from things better known to us). We suggest that a similar consideration applies to epagôgê. Although Aristotle acknowledges that epagôgê can be applied in different ways in, e.g., science and rhetoric, he assumes that all applications start with that which better known to us and end with that which is better known to nature. However, there are still several issues that need to be addressed: In which sense is the concept of epagôgê a unity? Are different applications of epagôgê species of a single genus? Are the uses analogical? Or do they stand in a pros hen relation to one another? The panel proposes to tackle these issues based on Aristotle’s considerations in the Analytics, Topics, Physics, and Ethics. The themes of the panel tackle a wide range of philosophical issues that fit the themes of the conference, including logic, epistemology and philosophy of science, philosophy of nature and ethics.